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Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law
Zoning Restrictions on Location of
Adult Businesses
Alan C. Weinstein
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M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979;
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THIS YEAR'S REPORT CONCENTRATES on recent legal developments
concerning regulation of the location of "adult entertainment busi-
nesses." Such regulations raise serious constitutional issues because the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression extends to non-
obscene sexually oriented media.' The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
has established that local government may single out adult businesses
for special regulatory treatment in the form of locational restrictions if
the local government can show a substantial public interest in regulating
such businesses unrelated to the suppression of speech and if the reg-
ulations allow for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication,"
which essentially translates into a reasonable number of alternative lo-
cations.2 An ordinance will be struck down, however, when government
officials attempt to regulate because they object to the sexually explicit
messages conveyed by adult businesses or seek to exclude, or severely
restrict, adult businesses through an outright ban or excessive locational
requirements.3
1. The importance of these issues can be seen in the fact that between 1976 and
1991 the U.S. Supreme Court decided five cases challenging the constitutionality of
state or local regulation of adult businesses, while state and lower federal courts have
ruled on hundreds of such challenges over the past two decades. See Barnes v. Glen
Theatres, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215
(1990), City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
2. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and Young
v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
3. See, e.g, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (striking
down ban on all live entertainment); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278
(8th Cir. 1991) (requiring at least thirty of thirty-six adult businesses to relocate to 0.54
percent of the total land area of the city).
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I. The Ongoing Search for a General Standard
Most recent decisions approach the "reasonable alternative avenues of
communication" issue by asking whether there are an "adequate" num-
ber of "potential sites" for adult businesses within the "relevant local
real estate market." As currently defined, this standard allows consid-
eration of economic factors to define the "relevant real estate market"
but bars consideration of "commercial viability" for particular sites that
are found to be within the relevant market.4 This definition affords local
government ample opportunity to impose significant locational restric-
tions on adult businesses to avoid undesirable secondary effects, but
prevents local government from effectively banning such businesses by
limiting them either/both to an insufficient number of locations to meet
the local demand for adult entertainment and/or to locations that present
insuperable physical, legal, or economic barriers to development or
operation.
Recent cases show that courts have applied this general standard
somewhat differently in regard to the choice of a "yardstick" with
which to determine whether the regulation meets the constitutional test.
As stated in one case,
Courts have looked to a variety of factors in assessing the sufficiency of available
sites, including "the percentage of land theoretically available to adult businesses,
the number of sites potentially available in relation to the population of the city, the
number of sites compared with the existing number of adult businesses, or the num-
ber of businesses desiring to offer adult entertainment." 5
The "percentage of land area" test derives from the Renton case,
where the U.S. Supreme Court found that allowing 5 percent of the
city's total land area for adult businesses was adequate.6 Thus, for ex-
ample, in Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.LC. v. City of Aurora,7 the Tenth Circuit
upheld an ordinance because "[s]exually oriented businesses may locate
within [10.9 percent of the city's area] ... [which is] more land on
which to relocate than was found to be adequate in Renton and its
progeny."8 The problem with this "percentage" approach is that it fails
to inquire deeply enough into the factual setting for a given community.
Percentage of land area is a meaningless number unless it is scrutinized
within the context of the adult use ordinance and the number of adult
businesses that are reasonably anticipated to require locations. While 5
4. See, e.g., Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir.
1993).
5. Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
6. 475 U.S. at 53-54.
7. 136 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1998).
8. Id. at 688.
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percent may be adequate for suburban Renton, Washington-where, at
most, only one existing adult business would have to relocate-that
same percentage might be inadequate for an urban community where
a relatively large number of adult businesses would be required to re-
locate. Conversely, a very small community with no existing businesses
may only require a significantly smaller percentage. 9
The "number of sites potentially available in relation to the popu-
lation of the city" approach is illustrated by University Books and Vid-
eos, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County.10 There, in ruling on a motion
for a preliminary injunction, the court compared the sites/population
ratio yielded by the ordinance in question (one site per 111,860 persons)
with those from several cases involving other Florida jurisdictions-
which ranged from a low of one per 4,091 for Boynton Beach to a high
of one per 38,642 persons for Broward County-and found the ordi-
nance was likely to be declared unconstitutional." This approach is
problematic for the same reason as the "percentage of area" approach:
it fails to inquire sufficiently into the specific situation in the jurisdiction
in question. The fact that a site/population ratio in a particular juris-
diction is high or low in comparison to other jurisdictions means little
in itself. For example, a suburban community (population 60,000) with
one current adult business and an "available" site for one additional
adult business would, by the foregoing analysis, have a relatively high
ratio of one site per 30,000 persons, but this by itself is meaningless
absent some indication that potential adult businesses are unable to find
"available" sites. Moreover, there is no consistency in the ratios for
decided cases. For example, while in Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City of
St. Petersburg, 12 a Florida federal district court struck down an ordi-
nance yielding a ratio of one site for every 12,526 residents, a different
Florida federal district court upheld an ordinance more than three times
as restrictive (one site for every 38,462 residents). 3
In contrast, "the number of sites compared with the existing number
of adult businesses" standard is clearly meaningful, since an ordinance
does not provide an "adequate" number of sites if existing businesses
that are required to relocate cannot find available sites. Thus, courts
9. See, e.g., Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
10. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
11. Id. at 1372-73.
12. 969 F. Supp. 1288 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
13. See International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 726 F. Supp.
1568 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 941 F.2d 1157 (llth Cir. 1991).
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will strike down ordinances that provide fewer sites than are needed
for relocation and uphold ordinances that provide an adequate number. 14
Finally, "the number of businesses desiring to offer adult entertain-
ment" standard may or may not be useful depending on how it is ap-
plied by the court. If the court engages in nothing more than speculation
about the "number of businesses," then the standard is meaningless. On
the other hand, the standard can be meaningful if the court requires
those challenging the ordinance to provide evidence about potential
businesses that can be examined and weighed by the trier of fact.
The bottom line is that there is no one measurement, ratio, or ap-
proach that will yield a "magic number" defining how many sites are
needed for an adult businesses ordinance to be declared constitutional.
The "adequate alternative avenues of communication" standard is ex-
tremely fact-dependent, and the number of sites needed to satisfy the
standard may vary quite dramatically from community to community.
II. Other Locational Issues
A. Statewide Zoning of Adult Businesses in New Jersey
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 15 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that a New Jersey community could not justify its exclusion of adult
entertainment businesses by contending that access to such entertain-
ment was readily available in neighboring communities. The Court
speculated, however, that if there had been some form of county zoning
in place, then it might be constitutional to allow adult entertainment in
"only selected areas of the county and to exclude it from primarily
residential communities, such as the Borough of Mount Ephraim."' 6
Eighteen years later, the Court's speculation on the relationship be-
tween extraterritorial zoning and zoning of adult businesses has become
reality. In Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Center, Inc. ,'7 the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the constitutionality of a state
statute 18 that imposed locational restrictions on adult businesses need
not be determined solely by reference to the boundaries of the munici-
14. Compare Levi v. City of Ontario, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (striking
down an ordinance because it provided only one site for relocating two businesses)
with Lim v. City of Long Beach, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (upholding
ordinance creating 109 sites, which could accommodate up to twenty-seven businesses
simultaneously, where no more than five businesses would be required to relocate).
15. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
16. Id. at 76.
17. 722 A.2d 530 (N.J. 1999).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-7 (West 1991).
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pality in which the business challenging the restriction seeks to locate.
In this case, the plaintiff business argued that the statute was unconsti-
tutional because there were no sites in the township that met the stat-
ute's locational criteria. 19 Citing Schad, the New Jersey Supreme Court
remanded the matter to a lower court for determination of whether
adequate alternative sites are available in the relevant market area, de-
fined as "areas located in other municipalities 'within reasonable prox-
imity to the Saddle Brook location.' ",20 The court instructed the lower
court to examine both "market" (the regional supply and distribution
of customers for and providers of adult entertainment) and regulatory
(local zoning codes) factors in determining the regional availability of
adult entertainment.2'
B. "Natural Barriers"
In Restaurant Row Associates v. Horry County,22 the South Carolina
Supreme Court, inter alia, rejected an adult business owner's claim that
the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway served as a "natural barrier" that
insulated properties from the "secondary effects" of the adult business.
The business owner claimed that because of this "natural barrier," he
should not be required to meet the ordinance's distancing requirements
since their purpose-protecting properties from negative secondary ef-
fects-was adequately served by the waterway.23 The court rejected the
claim, noting that the waterway was currently served by a ferry and
would soon be crossed by a bridge near the adult business.24 This ruling
is in line with a similar rejection of the "natural barriers" theory by the
Ninth Circuit.25
19. 722 A.2d at 532.
20. Id. at 535.
21. Id. at 535-36.
22. 516 S.E.2d 442 (S.C. 1999).
23. Id. at 448.
24. Id. at 448-49.
25. See Vicary v. City of Corona, 119 F.3d 8, 1997 WL 406768 (9th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished decision), overturning Vicary v. City of Corona, 935 F. Supp. 1083 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
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